

Can a Radio Drama Influence Awareness, Prioritization, and Willingness to Respond to Gender Based Violence? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Tanzania

Beatrice Montano, Salma Emmanuel, Donald P. Green, Dylan W. Groves, Bardia Rahmani *

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Abstract

Can edutainment sensitize listeners to the problem of gender-based violence (GBV) and build support for a collective response? While a robust literature focuses on the incidence of intimate partner violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, few studies consider the broader range of threats that women experience in public settings, such as harassment, sexual assault, and sexual violence. We study how edutainment shapes awareness, policy priorities, and preferred responses to these aspects of GBV through a placebo-controlled experiment randomized at the village level in rural Tanzania. A random sample of 1,250 villagers was interviewed at baseline and invited to one of two randomly assigned radio drama screenings, then interviewed again one month later. The 90-minute radio drama that focuses on GBV both raises awareness about the risks women face in their daily lives and increases the importance that audiences accord to sexual violence as a community problem. Narrative mass media offers an effective and scalable means for spurring collective action responses to threats to women's safety in public spaces.

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1 Introduction

Nearly 1 in 3 women worldwide have experienced physical and/or sexual violence (WHO 2021). Gender-based violence (GBV) takes many forms, and its prevalence is widely believed to be underestimated (Watts and Zimmerman 2002). Researchers and practitioners worldwide have studied interventions designed to decrease gender-based violence. In addition to community-based informational campaigns, educational programs, and advocacy meetings, much of the literature has focused on mass media interventions (Abramsky et al. 2016; Andrade et al. 2018; Arias 2019; Banerjee et al. 2019; El-Khoury and Shafer 2016; Gottert et al. 2020; Green et al. 2020; Keller et al. 2010; Lee et al. 2010; Sommarin et al. 2014; Thapa et al. 2018). Media interventions are an especially promising tool in low-income countries, as they may be deployed at scale in settings where state capacity is limited. However, the preponderance of current research about media interventions to reduce GBV focuses on intimate partner violence (WHO 2021), while other manifestations of GBV have received much less attention (Watts and Zimmerman 2002). As a result, our understanding of whether mass media interventions can address sexual harassment and assault outside of the household remains limited.

This paper fills this gap by studying the effect of media portrayals of sexual violence outside of the home. Our setting is rural Tanzania, and our focus is perceptions of risk and support for community action to deter perpetrators of sexual assault in public spaces. We make two primary contributions. First, we provide one of the first detailed accounts of perceptions of GBV risks in public spaces in Sub-Saharan Africa. We provide new measures to further our understanding of GBV: we ask respondents whether certain activities put women at risk of sexual assault, and we ask whether they think others in their community agree with their assessment. Another critical component of our measurement efforts is the assessment of appropriate community responses: to what extent do respondents view sexual violence as an important policy concern, and to what extent would they take action to report and testify against perpetrators?

Second, we evaluate whether narrative media influences audience's perceptions of risk and support for community action against GBV in public spaces. We report the results of a randomized controlled trial that exposes Tanzanian communities to a locally-tailed radio drama that highlights the threats of GBV in rural communities and models pathways for responding to GBV or a placebo drama. Four weeks after the exposure to the radio dramas, we collect survey outcomes gauging respondents' perceptions and support for responses. All of our measures were registered in a public-facing pre-analysis plan.

Descriptively, we find that rural Tanzanians do perceive that women routinely face risk of sexual violence. Across the various measures of risk perceptions, we find that on average almost 60% of the control group say that women face a particular risk in their daily lives. Respondents for the most part agree that GBV should be reported, especially to a local authority, that it should be punished, at least somewhat harshly, and that they would be willing to testify in court against a perpetrator. Turning to priorities, roughly half the respondents recognize gender-based violence as a serious problem, want to make the fight against it a community priority, and support leaders who campaign on this issue.

With respect to the experimental results, we find that media substantially alters these perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions. Exposure to *Boda Bora* significantly increased the perception that women face genuine risks in a host of different situations. *Boda Bora* also substantially increased support for community action by elevating the importance of GBV as a political and social priority. However, not all outcomes were affected: *Boda Bora* did not significantly shape expectations about the community's perceptions of risk and of whether they would take action, nor did it change respondents' punitiveness towards perpetrators.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the media intervention, the Tanzanian context, and the study design. Section 3 shows the results for the key outcomes of interest, and Subsection 3.2 discusses heterogeneous effects by gender as per our pre-analysis plan. Section 4 discusses.

2 Data and Research Design

2.1 Intervention: Content of the radio drama

We investigate the effect of entertainment-education on GBV related outcomes by analyzing community screenings of an abridged version of the radio drama *Boda Bora*. Set in the Tanga Region of Tanzania and recorded in Kiswahili, *Boda Bora* was written and produced by the Tanga-based grassroots non-governmental organization UZIKWASA in an effort to reduce GBV and call attention to the pervasive risk women face. The 90 minute radio drama presented to study participants was distilled from a longer, multi-week radio soap opera called *Boda Bora*. The drama tells the story of a grassroots campaign to prevent and report instances of sexual violence against women and girls. The research team worked with the NGO to condense the radio drama by focusing on key plotlines, so that it could be presented to participants in a single sitting, and to add message-relevant narration.

The *Boda Bora* plotline follows a young boda-boda driver, Juma, as he seeks to mobilize his peers to

stop engaging in and facilitating sexual assault and child prostitution, and to organize a collective effort to deter potential perpetrators and report sexual violence to authorities. A scene-by-scene summary of *Boda Bora* can be found in [Appendix B](#).

Placebo villages received instead the screening of an audio drama about environmental protection. For purposes of the present paper, the key feature of the placebo drama is that it makes no mention of the primary topics covered by *Boda Bora*. [Rahmani et al. \(2023b\)](#) reports that placebo drama affected an array of environment-related outcomes, such as the prioritization of environmental conservation.

2.2 Intervention: Delivery of the radio drama

The intervention was designed in collaboration with the local non-governmental organization UZIK-WASA, but the research design was implemented by a Tanzanian research team trained and supervised by Innovations for Poverty Action in collaboration with the authors.

In each treatment and placebo village, 40 randomly selected respondents (20 males and 20 females) were surveyed and then invited to attend a local community audio screening of the respective abridged radio drama. [Appendix D](#) offers more details on the sampling process followed within each village. All female respondents were surveyed by female interviewers; all male respondents, by male interviewers. We made every effort to maintain symmetry between experimental groups when encouraging participation in the listening events. Enumerators conducting baseline surveys were blind to the edutainment assignment of each village, so that their encouragement to attend the screening could not be affected by the content of the audio drama.

In each village, a single screening was held one or two days after the baseline survey in the early evening to accommodate respondents' work obligations. The screening team played the radio drama on portable speakers to the audience seated on chairs in an outdoor public space or indoors in case of rain. At all sites, two members of the research team briefly discussed the logistics of the screening and provided refreshments mid-way through the event but neither moderated the sessions nor interfered in discussions that may have arisen organically. A member of the screening team took attendance immediately before, during, and at the conclusion of the screening.

2.3 Design: Village Level Random Assignment

The study sites were 34 rural villages distributed evenly across 17 wards in Tanzania's northeastern Tanga Region. We conducted random assignment to experimental conditions at the village level after

blocking at the ward level. [Appendix D](#) shows the geographic distribution of treatment and placebo villages.

2.4 Design: Compliance and Attrition

Compliance rates were extremely high. Of the 1,360 targeted respondents, 1,358 completed a baseline survey and were invited to attend a screening with others surveyed from their village one or two days later. Fully 1,264 (93.08%) attended the screenings. Consistent with the assumptions of our design, attendance rates were similar among villages assigned to listen to *Boda Bora* (94.85 %) and the placebo drama (91.31%).¹ As demonstrated in [Table A1](#), participants who attended the drama on GBV have background attributes that are similar to those who attended the environmental drama.

The baseline survey was rolled out consecutively across wards so that the treatment and placebo pair in each ward received the baseline survey, audio screening, and follow-up surveys at approximately the same time. The baseline survey was conducted during April and May 2022. The follow-up survey team collected outcome measures approximately 4 weeks after the village screenings (between May and June 2022); 98.45% of baseline respondents completed the follow-up survey. Attrition rates were similar across experimental conditions (1% for the treatment group and 2% for the control group, see [Table A2](#)). In order to minimize demand effects, the interviewer teams were distinct from the teams that hosted the screenings.

2.5 Estimation

Ordinary least squares regression is used to estimate the effectiveness of the audio screening treatment. For purposes of estimation, the pool of subjects is restricted to compliers, i.e., those who complied with the invitation to attend a radio screening (either the treatment screening on environmental protection or the placebo screening on gender based violence). Let Y_i denote the survey outcome for subject i , and let T_i denote this subject's assigned treatment (1 if *Boda Bora*, 0 if the placebo drama). The regression model

$$Y_i = \beta T_i + \gamma_1 \text{ward}_{1i} + \gamma_2 \text{ward}_{2i} \dots + \gamma_k \text{ward}_{ki} + u_i$$

expresses the outcome as a linear function of the randomly assigned treatment, indicator variables for each of the k wards (blocks), and an unobserved disturbance term u_i . The key parameter of interest is β ,

¹Attendance was slightly higher in the treatment condition than the placebo condition due to idiosyncratic events on the day of the screening in some placebo villages, including a job action at a nearby sisal plantation in one village and heavy rains in two villages. However, because villagers and enumerators were blind to which drama was to be presented at the screening, we attribute this difference to bad luck rather than to systematic differences between the treatment and placebo control interventions.

which represents the complier average causal effect (CACE). Because assignment to treatment occurs at the village level, we report clustered standard errors. Exact p -values are calculated using randomization inference under the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect for any unit.

This regression model may also be used to confirm some basic assumptions about noncompliance and attrition. [Table A2](#) shows that audio screening attendance is not significantly related to treatment assignment at the 0.05 level once one accounts for LASSO-selected prognostic covariates, as would be expected given that enumerators were blind to treatment condition. That said, attendance was slightly higher in the treatment condition (94.85%) than the placebo condition (91.25%) due to idiosyncratic events on the day of the screening in some treatment villages, including heavy rains in two villages. However, because villagers and enumerators were blind to which drama was to be presented at the screening, we attribute this difference to bad luck rather than to systematic differences between the treatment and placebo control interventions.²

Turning from compliance to attrition, we see that missingness from the post-treatment survey is unrelated to treatment assignment ([Table A2](#)). Overall, it appears safe to assume that the placebo controlled design and outcome assessment preserves the independence of treatment assignment and potential outcomes.

3 Results

As discussed in the introduction, we consider three types of outcomes. First, we investigate respondents' perceptions of the risk that women face in different local life scenarios. Second, we document listeners' response to instances of GBV within their community. Last, we examine how much of a priority respondents deem GBV to be. As our study presents the first attempt to collect public opinion data in rural Sub-Saharan Africa around these three topic areas, we preface our analysis of experimental treatment effects by reporting the means of each outcome among the compliers in the control group of our sample. Because control group compliers are a random sample of all compliers, these descriptive results give a sense of village-level public opinion in the absence of exposure to the GBV intervention. In this study, because compliance rates are so high, the background attributes of compliers are scarcely different from the attributes of the sample as a whole.

²To demonstrate that the results hold up even when noncompliers are included, the Appendix presents results showing the effects of assigned treatment, rather than actual attendance; the results are nearly identification. Moreover, [Table A1](#) shows that experimental groups are still balanced across a range of covariates even when one accounts for non-compliers.

3.1 Main Results

3.1.1 Perceived Risk of GBV

How serious are the risks that women face in daily life? Inspired by the crime literature ([Macmillan et al. 2000](#)) and recent work in advanced economies ([Barbareschi 2023](#)), we measure respondents' perceptions of women's public safety. In assessing which scenarios to submit to our respondents, we sought to include a broad range of activities that were shared with researchers in qualitative conversations with women in rural Tanga region. All but one describe situations relating to the freedom of women to move around their community, as physical mobility has been recognized by the literature as an impediment to women's equality in access to education and the labor market ([Cheema et al. 2019](#); [Field and Vyborny 2022](#)). While none of the aforementioned research is set in Africa, the scenarios they consider are nonetheless applicable to Tanzania.

First, we ask respondents to tell us whether certain activities put women at risk of sexual assault. The control means shown in [Table 1](#) indicate the proportion of respondents who perceive these activities to be risky: 83% believe it is risky for a girl in their community to travel to town by herself, and 67% believe it is risky for a woman or a girl in their community to ride with a boda boda alone. Slightly more than half the women also report that they avoid attending certain celebrations or parties in the village out of concerns for their safety.

Next, we consider the threat of predatory behavior by men. These real-life predatory behaviors were reported by respondents in informal focus-groups as sources of public safety concern. Enumerators presented respondents with vignettes in which two friends in the village are having a discussion about how to interpret a favor that a man offers a girl. Each friend shares a different opinion about what these actions mean, and we ask our respondents to tell which they most agree with. About half of the respondents believe that if an older man gives a gift to a girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he is hoping to start a romantic relationship with her rather than to be generous with her; and 36% believe that when a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he does so because he wants to be romantically intimate with her rather than because he is just trying to be nice.

Overall, there is a widespread perception that women face risks when engaging in typical daily activities in public spaces. Interestingly, [Table A5](#) shows how these perceptions do not vary substantially between male and female respondents. Across all scenarios, similar rates of men and women perceive risks

or question the motives of men in ambiguous situations involving girls.

3.1.2 Effects of Exposure to *Boda Bora* on Risk Perceptions

We now turn our attention to the experimental results. How are risk perceptions changed by exposure to *Boda Bora*? [Table 1](#) shows that exposure to *Boda Bora* significantly increases the perception of risk that women face across all scenarios, with the exception of the gift scenario. Without adjusting for covariates, the complier average causal effect is estimated to be 6.4 percentage points; the estimate declines slightly when adjusting for the LASSO selected covariates to 6.0 percentage points. Both estimates have randomization inference p-values less than 0.001. The effects amount to more than a village-level standard deviation.

In keeping with our pre-analysis plan, we also investigate whether the narrative drama influences risk perceptions of men and women differently. [Table A6](#) shows that the estimated effects are similar for men and women.

Table 1: Effect on perception of risk of violence against women

	Activities perceived as risky for women			Actions perceived as suspicious for women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
GBV Treat	0.064***	0.060***	0.062***	0.060***	0.100***	0.103***	0.034	0.024	0.101***	0.085***
Standard Error	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.014	0.020	0.020	0.016	0.024	0.022	0.023
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.001	<0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	<0.001	0.162	0.153	0.009	0.007
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.59	0.59	0.83	0.83	0.67	0.67	0.53	0.53	0.36	0.36
Control SD	0.06	0.06	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Controls	No	42	No	24	No	28	No	19	No	29
Adj- R^2	0.04	0.13	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.06	0.03	0.07
Observations	1,251	1,251	1,250	1,250	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251	1,251

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: follow-up compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table for men, and for women adds the response to attending a celebration alone as per our PAP (note that excluding this for women leads to an index with the same control mean of 0.59 (village sd 0.06), coeff 0.074 (se 0.011) and Rlpval of 0). Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: "Do you think it is safe or risky for a girl in your community to travel to town by herself?" Columns 5 and 6 report results for responses to the question: "Do you think it is safe or risky for a woman or a girl in your community to ride with a boda boda alone?"; Columns 7 and 8 report results for responses to the question: "Which friend do you agree the most with? Friend 1: If an older man gives a gift to a young girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he wants to be generous with her; Friend 2: If an older man gives a gift to a young girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he is hoping to start a romantic relationship with her."; Columns 9 and 10 report results for responses to the question: "Which friend do you agree the most with? Friend 1: When a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he is just trying to be nice. Friend 2: When a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he does so because he wants to be romantically intimate with her."

3.1.3 Willingness to Take Action in Response to GBV

Next, we turn to the second group of outcome measures related to subjects' willingness to take action in response to GBV. First, enumerators asked respondents to imagine their cousin telling them about a man in their community who is having a relationship with a girl who is still in secondary school. Respondents are asked to advise the cousin on what to do: 55% advise him to report the issue to the girl's family, and 37% to report to a village leader.³ Table 2 shows the average advice score is 0.65 on a three step scale from 0 (no reporting) to 1 (report to leader).

Enumerators also asked respondents to imagine being a judge and deciding on the sentence for a man⁴ who was convicted of hitting a girl after she refused to have sex with him. In response to the question, "How severe should his punishment be?" 17% of respondents indicated that they would punish the perpetrator with a fine, while 80% of respondents said that they would require at least some jail time. 33% of respondents selected the maximum punishment option read by the enumerator "more than 5 years in jail." As shown in Table 2, on a scale on 0 (no punishment) to 1 (maximum punishment), the average punishment chosen by the control group compliers was 0.68.

Finally, we asked respondents to imagine finding out that a boda boda driver had sex with a girl in secondary school, whereupon a court official invites them to come to the court to stand as a witness against the man. The question stipulated that the respondents would need to spend one or two days in court away from work and family and pay 2,000 TZS in transportation fees, which is a standard requirement for rural Tanzanians. 56% of respondents said that that they would visit the court to testify.

These descriptive results suggest that many Tangan villagers recognize the value of taking action against GBV. Respondents agree GBV that should be reported, although usually to a family member rather than a local authority, that GBV merits punishment, usually with jail time, and about half believe they have an obligation to assist legal proceedings to hold GBV perpetrators accountable.

3.1.4 Treatment Effects on Willingness to Take Action

How did *Boda Bora* shape this response? The only measure that is substantially affected by the drama is willingness to testify against GBV perpetrators. Listeners exposed to *Boda Bora* are almost 7 percentage points more likely to state they would be willing to testify at a personal cost in terms of time and money

³In Green et al. (2020)'s work in Uganda the same control means are 50% for involving the parents and 36% for involving leaders.

⁴The question randomizes whether it is asking about a *poor* or a *rich* man; the rates are very similar across the two conditions and we therefore report here simply the mean.

(one-tailed p -value = 0.027). This estimate amounts to more than a half of a village-level standard deviation. We note that [Table A7](#) shows that this effect seems to be larger among men, although the interaction between treatment and respondent sex falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance ($p > 0.05$, two-tailed test).

On the other hand, we do not observe substantial effects on willingness to report GBV (coefficient = 2.5 percentage points, one-tailed p -value = 0.125) or willingness to punish GBV (coefficient = 0.1 percentage points, one-tailed p -value 0.506). Indexing across the three measures of “willingness to take action,” we observe a small but statistically significant positive effect of *Boda Bora* (coefficient = 3.4, one-tailed p -value = 0.041).

Table 2: **Response to GBV**

	How to respond to gender based violence							
	Index		Report GBV		Punish GBV		Testify against GBV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GBV Treat	0.032	0.034**	0.025	0.025	0.002	0.001	0.069*	0.076**
Standard Error	0.013	0.013	0.015	0.021	0.023	0.026	0.024	0.028
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.104	0.041	0.242	0.125	0.950	0.506	0.057	0.027
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.63	0.63	0.65	0.65	0.68	0.68	0.56	0.56
Control SD	0.07	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.11	0.11	0.10	0.10
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Controls	No	12	No	0	No	4	No	20
Adj- R^2	0.02	0.08	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.13
Observations	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,225	1,225	1,246	1,246

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: follow-up compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table. Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: “Your cousin tells you that he found out about a man in their community who is having a relationship with a girl who is still in secondary school. Your cousin has heard that the girl is saying yes to the man because he gives her money. How would you respond?”. The responses are scored as 0 for do nothing, 1 for report to family, and 2 for report to leaders; then the variable is divided by 2 to standardize to a 0-1. Columns 5 and 6 report results for responses to the question: “Imagine you were a judge and you had to decide the sentence for certain crimes. A [randomize: poor / rich] man is brought to you who has hit a girl after she refused to have sex with him. How long should his punishment be?”. The responses are scored as 0 for no punishment, 1 for fine, 2 for 1-3 months, 3 for 1 year, 4 for 1-4 years, and 5 for more than 5 years; then the variable is divided by 5 to standardize to a 0-1. Columns 7 and 8 report results for responses to the question: “Imagine that you found out that an boda boda driver had sex with a girl in secondary school. Someone from the court calls you and invites you to come to the court to be a witness against the man. You will have to spend one or two days in court away from work and family, and the transport fees will cost 2,000. How would you respond?”. Responses are scored as 0 for not testifying and 1 for testifying.

3.1.5 GBV as a Community Priority

The third topic area we investigate concerns the importance accorded to gender based violence as a community priority. First, enumerators ask the respondent to imagine a village about one day's walk away that is holding an election for village chairperson with two candidates. Enumerators then gave the respondent the choice between two candidates: the first candidate⁵ promises to fight against sexual violence in the village with slogan "Protect our girls from sugar daddies⁶ and rapists," whereas the second candidate promises to either improve roads (with slogan "Make our roads better") or improve education ("Better schools for our children").⁷ Interestingly, these election match-ups generate a 50/50 split on average among compliers in the control group, as shown in [Table 3](#).

In addition, enumerators presented respondents with two different sets of cards and asked them to rank the cards from most important to the least. The first set of cards showed "different goals for your village" and allows the respondent to rank (a) reducing sexual violence, (b) improving access to water, and (c) improving cell phone reception. On a scale of 0 (ranked last) to 1 (ranked first), the average rank of anti-GBV goal among the control group of compliers is 0.48: 22% ranked it first, 52% ranked it second, and 26% ranked it last.

The second set of cards showed "different social problems in villages in Tanzania" and asks respondents to rank "from biggest problem to smallest problem" (a) sexual violence against young girls, (b) alcoholism, (c) people not paying back loans, or (d) kids not going to school and people not working. Again, respondents in the control group rank sexual violence about equally to other social concerns; 18% ranked it first, 29% second, 29% third, and 24% last.

Taken together, these findings suggest that in the absence of narrative media, community members rank sexual violence roughly equally to other prominent community concerns such as roads, schools, water, and alcoholism.

3.1.6 Treatment Effects on Community Priorities

Participating in the screening of *Boda Bora* had a dramatic effect on the importance respondents accorded to GBV. On the index that averages across all the measures, treated listeners became 7.8 percentage

⁵Note that we randomize the name of the candidate, as it is indicative of the religion and gender of the candidate. We present results here averaged across the different identities of the candidate.

⁶In the Tanzanian context, "sugar daddy" is a common term that refers to a wealthy man who uses financial means to coerce young girls into having sex. The term typically carries a negative connotation and an implication of exploitation, especially when the girl in question is underage.

⁷Note that we randomize which is the platform of the second candidate and we present here averaged results across the two possible elections scenario.

points more likely to prioritize GBV – tantamount to more than one village-level standard deviation. The one-tailed p -value is less than 0.001. The same holds true across each of the component measures: those who listened to *Boda Bora* are 9.4 percentage points more likely to elect leaders who campaign on anti-GBV platforms. The drama also elevates villagers’ ranking of sexual violence as a political and social priority by 0.067 and 0.081, respectively. [Table A8](#) further demonstrates that *Boda Bora* raised the importance accorded to GBV among both male and female listeners equally.

Table 3: **Political priority of GBV**

	Measures of Anti-GBV Prioritization							
	Index		Vote anti-GBV platform		Anti-GBV political prior.		Anti-GBV social prior.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GBV Treat	0.078***	0.077***	0.094**	0.090***	0.065***	0.067***	0.081***	0.087***
Standard Error	0.010	0.011	0.021	0.025	0.013	0.014	0.012	0.015
Rl <i>p</i> -value	0.001	<0.001	0.010	0.005	0.006	<0.001	0.001	<0.001
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.48	0.48	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.47	0.47
Control SD	0.05	0.05	0.08	0.08	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.05
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Controls	No	18	No	4	No	37	No	26
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.09	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.13	0.02	0.08
Observations	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,225	1,225	1,225	1,225

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: follow-up compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table. Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: “*Imagine a village about one day’s walk from here is having an election for village chairperson. There are two candidates giving speeches. Let me tell you about each one and you can tell me which of the two you think should be elected. The first candidate is named [randomize: Mr. Salim, Mr. John, Mrs. Mwanahidi, Mrs. Nema] and [he / she] promises to fight against sexual violence in the village. Their slogan is “Protect our girls from sugar daddies and rapists.” The second candidate is named [randomize: Mr. Salim, Mr. John, Mrs. Mwanahidi, Mrs. Nema] and [he/she] promises to [randomize: improve roads / improve education]. Their slogan is [“Make our roads better” / “Better schools for our children”]. Which of these two candidates do you think should be elected?*” The responses are scored as 1 for voting for the Anti-GBV platform, 0 otherwise. Columns 5 and 6 report results for responses to the question: “*Here is a set of cards, which show different goals for your village (Reducing sexual violence; Access to water; Improved cell phone reception). Now, please rank the following goals starting from the one that is most important to you and ending with the goal that is least important.*” The responses are the inverse of the rank of the GBV card (such that 3 is the top priority), and then are divided by 3 to obtain a standardized measure 0-1. Columns 7 and 8 report results for responses to the question: “*Here is a set of cards, which show different social problems in villages in Tanzania. Now, please put them in order, from biggest problem to smallest problem. (Sexual violence against young girls; Alcoholism; Not paying back loans; Kids not going to school and people not working.)*”. The responses are the inverse of the rank of the GBV card (such that 4 is the top priority), and then are divided by 4 to obtain a standardized measure 0-1.

Interestingly, Table 4 shows that respondents who listened to *Boda Bora* also became more likely to report that their *partners* prioritize GBV as a political and social priority. The effects are somewhat smaller than effects on self-reported measures of prioritization but still amount to more than half of a village level standard deviation and are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Recall that the post-treatment interview took place a few weeks after exposure to the radio drama; it may be that partners discussed the content of the show or that audience members “projected” their own views onto their partners. Either way, this result suggests that exposure to the radio drama changed household norms concerning the salience of GBV as an issue.

Table 4: **Belief about partner’s political salience of GBV**

	Index		Perception of Partner’s Anti-GBV Prioritization			
	Index		Anti-GBV top political prior.		Anti-GBV top social prior.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GBV Treat	0.058**	0.051***	0.062**	0.057***	0.054*	0.046**
Standard Error	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.017	0.019	0.022
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.013	0.002	0.014	0.009	0.055	0.017
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.19	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.21	0.21
Control SD	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.08	0.08
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Controls	No	9	No	18	No	4
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.21	0.03	0.15	0.01	0.13
Observations	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: follow-up compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table. Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: “Here is a set of cards, which show different goals for your village (Reducing sexual violence; Access to water; Improved cell phone reception). Now, can you pick the goal that you think is most important for your partner?” Columns 7 and 8 report results for responses to the question: “Here is a set of cards, which show different social problems in villages in Tanzania. Now, please put them in order, from biggest problem to smallest problem. (Sexual violence against young girls; Alcoholism; Not paying back loans; Kids not going to school and people not working.) Now, can you pick the goal that you think is most important for your partner?”.

4 Discussion

This paper makes two important substantive contributions to the study of media effects on perceptions, attitudes, and preferred responses to gender based violence in developing countries. The first is to broaden the empirical study of narrative messages concerning violence against women. The *Boda Bora* radio drama is among the first to focus on violence against women *outside of the household*. This drama addresses a

concern that has rarely been measured in surveys in Sub-Saharan Africa: perceptions about the risks faced by women during daily activities in public spaces. Such risks are widely perceived, and the *Boda Bora* drama further sensitizes audiences.

The second contribution relates to the set of politically relevant outcomes that the edutainment literature seldom addresses, as highlighted also in [Emmanuel et al. \(2023\)](#) and [Rahmani et al. \(2023a\)](#). Our results show that narratives such as *Boda Bora* can substantially increase the salience of GBV as a community priority. Audiences exposed to this drama become much more likely to express support for local candidates who campaign on an anti-GBV platform; audiences also accord GBV higher priority as a local issue. By raising the salience of GBV as an issue, *Boda Bora* has the potential to set in motion changes that improve the safety of girls and women, either because village leaders are encouraged to improve safety or because a change in village norms deters potential perpetrators who might otherwise think that those around them are indifferent or reluctant to intervene.

The policy implications of dramas such as *Boda Bora* are potentially profound. This narrative has the potential to influence policy-relevant perceptions and attitudes. As we turn towards an endline survey and follow-up research, several additional research questions present themselves. First, how long-lasting are the persuasive effects of the drama? Previous research on narratives concerning early/forced marriage ([Green et al. 2023](#)), intimate partner violence ([Green et al. 2020](#)), and HIV stigma ([Green et al. 2021](#)) showed that the persuasive effects of radio dramas subsided over time but still remained large enough to be consequential even more than a year later. Second, how much larger would the persuasive effects be if the “dosage” of exposure were longer and more sustained than the 90-minute version presented in a single seating? Third, follow-up research is needed to assess whether increased awareness of GBV in such settings could lead to potential undesirable behaviors, especially among men. In societies where men hold power over their wife’s choices ([Boyer et al. 2022](#)), they might be less likely to allow women’s freedom of movement as they grow worried. We aim to determine whether this is a sizable concern at endline, and whether safe-transport options offer a potential solution to it.

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Supplemental Materials for

Can a Radio Drama Influence Awareness, Prioritization, and Willingness to Respond to Gender Based Violence?

May 28, 2023

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Appendix

A Endline Pre-Analysis Plan: a new outcome

Does increased awareness lead to increased gatekeeping among men?

A.1 Research question

Noting that baseline rates of men’s concern for women’s safety are as high as those of women and that treatment effects are just as strong, we raise the follow-up question of how concerns about women’s safety shape women’s outcomes in societies where men act as gatekeepers to women’s freedom. Rural Tanzania adheres to the traditional household dynamic whereby men are able to exert power over the women of their household and control their social, economic, and political choices.

In such a scenario, raising men’s concerns about women’s safety could have an unintended effect: **in the absence of (convenient) solutions, men might be less likely to allow women’s freedom of movement as they grow worried.** Allowing for less freedom could be the optimal choice for a man genuinely worried about his wife’s safety. Moreover, we ask whether, if a safe and accessible option becomes available, men whose gatekeeping behavior has increased only as a function of genuine worry are likely to take it up – therefore nullifying the negative effect of increased awareness of GBV. Should men not take up a safe and accessible option, the increased gatekeeping behavior would not be justified by safety concerns.

We therefore propose to investigate the existence of backlash analyzing men’s choices over their wives’ freedom of movement and their willingness to pay¹ for a safe transport option for their wives at endline. By showing how the demand for safe transport varies in the experimentally manipulated level of concern, the paper investigates whether there exists an inefficient *abuse of concern* by men, and whether this could be ameliorated by a market of cheaper and safer transport options.

Except for [Aguilar et al. \(2021\)](#), to the best of our knowledge, no other study has studied the intersection of concerns about women’s safety and backlash on men specifically. Given the large set of women’s safety-related policies and interventions being funded around the developing world, especially within the

¹Part of a larger project that aims at quantifying the willingness to pay for safe public transport by Silvia Barbareschi, Beatrice Montano, and Stefano Tripodi.

edutainment world, it is key to understand whether those might have unintended consequences for women and their male partners.

A.2 Outcome measures

The question will be answered through a conjoint and a willingness-to-pay elicitation carried out on the 475 married men belonging to the original sample.

The following measures have been drafted after focus-groups with men and women separately about safety in the area carried out in March 2023. Moreover, the relevance of the potential attributes investigated (and the feasibility and script of outcome 2) have been piloted, also in March 2023, on 15 respondents in the Pangani District of Tanga, Tanzania.

A.2.1 Outcome 1: Backlash

Through a **conjoint experiment**, we will establish whether exposure to the edutainment treatment might make husbands less likely to allow their wife freedom of movement.

- *Hypothesis 1*: exposure to Boda-Bora may decrease men's likelihood of allowing their wife to go somewhere
- *Measure*: likelihood of being "willing to let your wife go" from a conjoint experiment

Imagine that an organization who works for the community wants to invite your wife to town for a day. Unfortunately you cannot attend as this is an invitation only for some of the women in this village. Once in town, she will be given 15,000 TZShelling of airtime for herself. When she goes, they will deposit this money on her Mpesa account.

Would you let her go?

[Yes / No]

There are two options that she can go by. Let me tell you about each one and you can tell me which of the two you would pay for.

1. *In the first option a boda from town ["..." / "whom we know and trust"] is going to pick her up and bring her back for ["0" / "3,000" / "7,000"] TZShellings.*
2. *In the second option a boda from town ["..." / "whom we know and trust"] is going to pick her up and bring her back for ["0" / "3,000" / "7,000"] TZShellings.*

Which one would you pay for?

[I would not let her go in any case / Option 1 / Option 2]

- *Estimand*: treatment effect on measure

The estimand of interest is the β from $Y_{ji} = \beta T_j + u_{ji}$ where Y_{ji} is =1 if the husband *did not* want her wife to go, and T_j is a binary indicator for a village's treatment status.

Therefore a positive β implies the presence of **backlash** to the edutainment drama.

Note that Y_{ji} will be coded as:

- =1 if the husband *did not* want her wife to go in the first question, and 0 otherwise
- =1 if the husband *did not* want her wife to go in the second question when the options presented at least one "0 TZShillings" option
- =1 if the husband *did not* want her wife to go in the second question when the options presented at least one "whom we know and trust" option

For all specifications, we will calculate p-values with randomization inference and we will use robust standard errors clustered at the village-level.

A.2.2 Outcome 2: Men's demand for safety

- *Hypothesis 2*: exposure to Boda-Bora edutainment treatment increased men's demand for safety
- *Measure*: experimentally elicited willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a safe boda-boda ride

We will elicit men's WTP for a safe boda-boda ride for their wife to reach the nearest town to invited by an organization that works for the community, and for which once in town, she will be given 15,000 TZShelling of airtime for herself. [subsubsection A.2.3](#) shows the script that will be followed.

The dominant approach to **WTP elicitation** uses some variant of the classic Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (?) mechanism (BDM). As summarized in ?, these variants share a common structure. First, participants report a WTP value, W . Second, a random price P is drawn. Third, if $W \leq P$, the participant purchases the good at price P , otherwise they do not purchase and pay nothing. This mechanism shares the incentive properties of a second-price sealed-bid auction: truthful reporting is a weakly dominant strategy. ? show that the willingness-to-pay elicitation procedure can be adapted to rural settings and a large share (94%) of participants understand the mechanism.

The elicitation will follow a multiple price list (MPL) procedure. For a given set of 16 prices (from 1,000 to 15,000 TZShillings), we will ask a respondent whether he is willing to pay each price in ascending order. We will stop at the first price he is not willing to pay. The respondent's maximum WTP is the last price he accepted to pay for the safe trip. While MPLs identify a WTP interval, they are easier to understand than a "classic" BDM elicitation procedure, which asks respondents to immediately provide a value for their WTP. Before eliciting WTP for the safe trip, we will elicit that of a mock, commonly consumed good (a bottle of soda) to illustrate the elicitation procedure. To make sure respondents truthfully reveal their WTP, the elicitation will be incentivised: only men with a WTP higher or equal than the random price they draw will be able to buy a safe trip for their wives to town.

Note that for ethical reasons, we will provide the equivalent of the maximum price on the price distribution to each respondent *before* they start the WTP exercise.

Most importantly, we will actually **organize the events** that women have been invited to, and for which husbands are paying for. These will be a day-long event which will be run by IPA Tanzania in collaboration with the research team where women will be rewarded as explained in the WTP question to their husbands. Importantly, safe bodas will be provided both for those who have accepted to pay for them – through the money collected during the WTP measure within the survey – as well as for those who did not, in order to not exacerbate differences among wives independently of their husbands answers.

- *Estimand*: treatment effect on willingness to pay

The estimand of interest is the β from $WTP_{ji} = \beta T_j + u_{ji}$ where WTP_{ji} is the willingness to pay by the husband, and T_j is a binary indicator for a village's treatment status.

Therefore a positive β implies that exposure to the edutainment drama **increased the demand for safe transport**. Note that this effect can only be attributed to *increased awareness of GBV risk* under the assumption that the experiment does not influence other variables that at the same time determine the WTP for the safe option (i.e., exclusion restriction). The most apparent way in which this could happen is if the edutainment program changed the WTP for the safe option regardless of the perception of risk. This could happen, for example, if the experiment changed the perceptions about social approval of a safe option for other reasons not connected to the perception of risk. We

will try to validate the exclusion restriction assumption adding in the survey a measure for social approval.

For all specifications, we will calculate p-values with randomization inference and we will use robust standard errors clustered at the village-level.

We will analyze heterogeneous treatment effects for pre-treatment covariates² by including an interaction with the treatment variable on the right-hand side of the regression. We will also analyze heterogeneous treatment effects among a larger-set of baseline covariates through an automated procedure (GRF and BART).

A.2.3 Measures' construction: safety features

Prior to the main data collection, we will perform a **small pilot study** with 40 respondents in the district of Pangani, in the same region of Tanga where the main study takes place. We will interview both men and women to gather information and guide the design of the conjoint and the WTP.

Through a series of **conjoint experiments**, we will identify:

- a. Which transport mean is perceived to be the safest mean of transportation (*walk alone with a torch, walk alone with a whistle, walk with four other women from the village, with a bike, with a boda-boda never used before, with a boda-boda used before, with a dalala*) by men and women, assuming the woman has to travel from the village to town
- b. Whether the perception of the safety of each mean of transportation changes across day times (*4 pm, 8 pm*)
- c. Which activity gives positive utility, if completed, to both men and women (*pick up a gift that will/will not be shared with husband, meet only women/women and men for an activity organized by a group of religious leaders/a group of western NGOs who work on women's equality*)
- d. Whether men's choices are different in case the activity has to be performed by their partners or by their daughters
- e. What could be plausible prices for a boda-boda ride

²(1) Traveling habits elicited through the direct questions (2) Distance from nearest town measured in Km (3) Household model of bargaining elicited through direct questions (4) Perception of risk at midline, and at endline

We will present each respondent with several hypothetical scenarios where he/she has to choose among two possible options, formed by combining different attributes. ?? shows the script of the conjoints in detail, which have been constructed through qualitative fieldwork and piloted in March 2023.

In order to mirror (even though extremely under-powered) the larger study, before presenting the scenarios, we will inform a randomly selected sub-sample of respondents about the community-perceived risk for a woman to take a boda-boda trip by herself.

We will then calculate how much each attribute influenced respondents' choices, rank them and compare them across men and women, as well as across treated and non treated respondents. The empirical strategy will rely on simple OLS regressions.

- **Conjoints**

Conjoint 1 - Objective: Understand the features that we need to change in order to make a scenario be interpreted as safe and another scenario be interpreted as unsafe by men.

Now we are going to present you with some scenarios where we ask that you make a choice between two options.

Note [only show to random ½ of the respondents]:

We want to share some information with you. 8 out of 10 people in some villages in Tanga District said that it is risky for a girl in their community to travel to town by herself.

Let's suppose your wife has been invited to a wedding of your family members. Unfortunately it is at a time where you cannot attend so she would have to go without you. There are two options that she can go by. Let me tell you about each one and you can tell me which of the two you think is the safest.

1. *Option 1: She's going [randomize: (1/3) with a boda / (1/3) with a boda whom we know and trust/ (1/15) to walk alone with a torch /(1/15) to walk alone with a whistle / (1/15) to walk with other 4 women from this village / (1/15) with a bike / (1/15) with the daladala] and she will be back by [randomize: 4pm / 8pm].*
2. *Option 2: She's going [randomize: (1/3) with a boda / (1/3) with a boda whom we know and trust/ (1/15) to walk alone with a torch /(1/15) to walk alone with a whistle / (1/15) to walk*

with other 4 women from this village / (1/15) with a bike / (1/15) with the daladala] and she will be back by [randomize: 4pm / 8pm].

Which one do you think is the safest? [(0) I would never let her go (1) Option 1, (2) Option 2, (99) I don't know]

If respondent's daughter being above X years old:

You told us you have a daughter. What if instead it was your daughter who was going to the wedding of your family members. As a reminder, the two options are ... [same as above]. Which one would be the safest for her? [(1) Option 1, (2) Option 2, (99) I don't know]

Conjoint 2 - Objective: Understand the features that we need to change in order to make a scenario where the willingness to send her is high and one scenario where the willingness to send her is low.

Let's suppose an organization who works for the community wants to invite your wife to town for a day. Unfortunately you cannot attend as this is an invitation only for some of the women in this village. There are different things that might be happening while she is in town. Let me tell you about each one and you can tell me for which one you'd let her go for.

Randomly assign $\frac{1}{2}$ B1, $\frac{1}{2}$ B2.

B1. Benefits woman. Money: gift vs (shameful) job.

- 1. Option 1: She's going to pick up a gift for herself. It is [randomize: ($\frac{1}{2}$) airtime / ($\frac{1}{4}$) a day-job helping to serve food at the tables for an event for the organization / ($\frac{1}{4}$) a day-job helping to cook for an event for the organization]. It is worth [randomize: 5.000 TZShillings / 10.000 TZShillings / 15.000 TZShillings]. [randomize: We will deposit this money on her Mpesa account. / She will have to spend this money in town in a few shops we will tell her about..]*
- 2. Option 2: She's going to pick up a gift for herself. It is [randomize: ($\frac{1}{2}$) airtime / ($\frac{1}{4}$) a day-job helping to serve food at the tables for an event for the organization / ($\frac{1}{4}$) a day-job helping to cook for an event for the organization]. It is worth [randomize: 5.000 TZShillings / 10.000 TZShillings / 15.000 TZShillings]. [randomize: We will deposit this money on her*

Mpesa account. / She will have to spend this money in town in a few shops we will tell her about..]

Which one would you let her go to town for? [(0) I would never let her go (1) Option 1, (2) Option 2, (99) I don't know]

B2. Benefits woman. (shameful) activity.

1. *Option 1: She's going to participate in a workshop to discuss about health, where there will be discussions among her and other [randomize: women / women and men]. The workshop will be conducted in the town center and will be led by [randomize: a group of religious leaders / a group of western NGOs who work on women's equality].*
2. *Option 2: She's going to participate in a workshop to discuss about health, where there will be discussions among her and other [randomize: women / women and men]. The workshop will be conducted in the town center and will be led by [randomize: a group of religious leaders / a group of western NGOs who work on women's equality].*

Which one would you let her go to town for? [(0) I would never let her go (1) Option 1, (2) Option 2, (99) I don't know]

• Willingness to Pay Exercise (English)

In this section, we present the details of the Willingness to Pay Exercise, please refer to the survey script attached for any other information.

To thank you for your time in participating in this study, we would like for you to participate in a game.

A. Trial Round

Let me explain to you how this game works first. Think about the following situation: you're going to the shop because you want to buy a soda.

Usually, when you're going to the shop you already know the maximum price you are willing to pay for the soda.

After you get to the shop, you ask them for the price and you decide whether to buy the soda or not. Your

decision depends on the shop price of the soda: if the price is higher than the one you had thought about, you will not buy the soda. If instead, the price is equal or lower than what you had thought about, you will buy the soda for the shop price.

Okay, so let's try to simulate what happens in the shop here too. Imagine you want to buy a soda.

So just like you would do at home, you will think about the maximum price you would pay for the soda.

After you have thought about this price, I will ask you whether you would buy the soda for 6 possible prices.

For example, I will ask you "Would you buy the soda for 1,000 TZShillings?"; "Would you buy the soda for 1,500 TZShillings?"; and so on. Now we will know what your maximum price that you were thinking about is.

But note that, just like in the shop, the price you're answering is not be the price you will pay for the soda.

The actual price was determined by the shop price, So here, we will simulate that with a scratch card. The price you scratch is like the price the shopkeeper would tell you.

Your decision depends on the scratched price on the card: if the price is higher than the one you told us, you will not buy the soda.

If instead the price is equal or lower than the one you told us, you will buy the soda for the price scratched.

Okay, let me ask you what price would you buy the soda for.

- Would you buy this soda for 0 Shillings (for free)?
 - Are you sure you don't want to buy this soda even if it for free?
- Would you buy this soda for 500 Shillings ?
 - Are you sure you do not want to buy this soda for 500 TZShillings?
- Would you buy this soda for 1000 Shillings ?
 - Are you sure you do not want to buy this soda for 1000 TZShillings?
- Would you buy this soda for 1500 Shillings ?
 - Are you sure you do not want to buy this soda for 1500 TZShillings?

- Would you buy this soda for 2000 Shillings ?
 - Are you sure you do not want to buy this soda for 2000 TZShillings?

Great. This means that the maximum price you are willing to pay for the soda is [insert answer].

Now we have to see what the actual price of the soda will be.[present the scratch card and have the respondent pick and scratch a price]

Great. Thank you for scratching the price of the shopkeeper. The price is lower than your willingness to pay for the soda, so you can buy the soda the price is higher, unfortunately, you have not manage to buy the soda .

B. Bidding game Great! We finished our trial round. Now, let's play the real game.

Imagine that an organization who works for the community wants to invite your wife to town for a day. If you win this game, once in town, she will be given 15,000 TZShelling of airtime for herself. When she goes, they will deposit this money on her Mpesa account.

Just to remind you. Now you are playing for a boda ride for your wife because an organization who works for the community has invited your wife to town for a day, and if she goes she can get 15,000 TZShelling of airtime for herself, which will be deposited on her Mpesa account . Now we can play to see if you win the chance to send your wife to go to town for this.

Now I am going to ask you to think about the maximum price you would pay for a boda ride for your wife. This is just like when you thought about the maximum price you would pay for the soda, but now this money would be used for the boda ride for your wife when she goes to town.

If you are ready, I will present you a list of 16 possible prices for the boda ride to take your wife to town and I will ask you whether you would be willing to pay each possible price for it, just like we did before. The prices range from 0 to 15,000 TZShillings and increase by 1,000 TZShillings each time.

Remember that just like before, the price you state will not be the price you will pay for it: the actual price paid will be determined by the scratch card.

- Would you get her a boda for 0 Shillings (for free)?
 - Are you sure you don't want to get her a boda even if it for free?
- Would you get her a boda for 1,000 TZShillings?
 - Are you sure you do not want to get her a boda for 1,000 TZShillings?
- Would you get her a boda for 2,000 TZShillings?
 - Are you sure you do not want to get her a boda for 2,000 TZShillings?
- Would you get her a boda for 3,000 TZShillings?
 - Are you sure you do not want to get her a boda for 3,000 TZShillings?
- ...
- Would you get her a boda for 16,000 TZShillings?
 - Are you sure you do not want to get her a boda for 16,000 TZShillings?

Great. Thank you for answering these questions. This means that the maximum price you are willing to pay for a boda ride for your wife to go to town to attend the event where she will get 15,000 TZShelling of airtime for herself, which will be deposited on her Mpesa account is [insert answer].

Now we have to see what the actual price of the boda will be. Here is the scratch card, which has 16 prices on it. The price may be 0, 1,000, ..., up to 15,000 TZShillings.

Everything is just like in the soda round. The prices are shuffled, so that they are in a random order on the paper. Under each scratch-box there is one price, but it is not possible to know what this price is before scratching and the enumerator does not know the order of the prices on the sheet. You are required

to choose only one of these boxes to be scratched.

If the maximum price you told us you would pay is higher than the price on the scratch card, she will not get to go, and you will not have to pay for the boda.

If the maximum price you agreed to pay is lower than the price on the scratch card, you will pay for your wife's boda to go get the airtime, and you will only have to pay the price you scratched for it.

[present the scratch card and have the respondent pick and scratch a price]

Great. Thank you for scratching the price of the boda ride for your wife. The price is higher [lower] than your willingness to pay, so you have to pay this [scratched price] for the boda for your wife to go pick up the gift.

Actually, I have just received a message saying that we will have enough bodas for everyone so she can go too and you will not have to pay for it. We will just deliver all the gifts tomorrow morning here at the house. Thank you for participating in the game anyways!

B Boda Bora's plotline

Narration: Every village has its problems, and our village was no different. People complained about the poor roads, a lack of electricity – the usual things. But there was one problem in our village that no one was talking about. The problem was gender violence – women being raped, and people sleeping with girls so young they were still in school. This problem was having a deep impact on both the physical and emotional health of women in our community, and yet no one took action. This is the story of someone who became tired of inaction and decided to make a difference – and who inspired others to do the same.

Ep. 1, Scene 1 Sister and friend talk about return of Juma (good boda) from town after his failed musical career in Dar es Salaam

Ep. 1, Scene 2 Juma's (good boda) parents discuss Juma. Husband is saying he spent a lot of money to send him to dar to pursue music. He could have gone for fishing. This time, the wife is saying that instead of him staying at home they should make him a boda boda driver. The husband says that he will have to do it as a loan to keep him serious. But he is also trying to say that the boda boda business is risky.

Ep. 1, Scene 3 Summary: Juma (good boda) tells Elisa (his sister Mwanana's friend) that he is back. Elisa meets with his sister Mwanaidi and they discuss his situation, and talk about importance of staying focused on studies instead of finding a boyfriend for someone like Juma.

Ep. 1, Scene 4 Summary: Abou (the bad boda) expresses support for sister Nana and Nana expresses reliance on Abou. Abou tells Nana to stay away from boda boda's because they are dangerous.

Ep. 1, Scene 5 Summary: Juma talks to Halima (Aboud's Aunt) and tells her about coming back and getting a Boda. He tells her that he is getting it as a loan and she approves for self reliance reasons. Then she warns about the evils of boda boda (rape, stealing corpses, facilitating sugar daddies), and connects the danger to whether Juma would want his sister to see the same harm. Juma says he knows his sister is a good girl and he knows how it feels to have his dreams taken away.

Ep. 1, Scene 6 Summary: Juma has arrived to the station and Ali is giving him the rules of the group. Juma is saying thanks for welcoming me but there are things that I cannot stand such as you guys taking school girls for sugar daddies, and some get raped. Bodas try to convince him that the negative attitude is bad and if he doesn't do that, he won't be able to work.

Ep. 2, Scene 1 Summary: Elisa (Abou [the bad boda] love interest] expresses the fact that she thinks Abou is cute. Mwanaidi (Juma's sister) gets offended, because by implication Elisa thinks Juma is dirty or

bad. Mwanaidi says she should ride with Juma but Elisa wants to ride with Abou. Juma says Elisa should watch out for Abou.

Ep. 5, Scene 6 Abu and Ali (bad bodas) discuss their evil plans including delivering suspicious cargo and hooking up with Mwanaidi (Ali) and Elisa (Abu)

Narration: The bodas were doing all kinds of crimes in the community – for example, they stole a woman’s earrings straight from her ears! But by far the biggest problem was sexual violence. The bodas often raped girls but were never punished because they kept a code of silence, and never monitored or reported on one another. But their contribution to sexual violence was also in other ways besides physically attacking women. For example, they would often transport girls under 18 years old to sugar daddies – old men who prey on young girls. Sometimes the bodas and the sugar daddies would trick these girls by offering them gifts or money, or by manipulating their emotions. All of these behaviors were forms of gender violence. Like I said, our village had a problem: girls were not safe from sexual violence, and no one was working to stop it.

Ep. 2, Scene 3 Sugar Daddy says its easy to pick up girls these days you just ask a boda boda to go pick them up for you. Sugar says he has heard stories about your son joining boda boda and that boda boda is talking negatively about them. Tells Sakala (Juma dad) to be careful. Sakala tells the sugar daddy “are you trying to threaten my son”. Coffee seller tries to calm both of them down, this is just beginning of the day so they shouldn’t be arguing.

Ep. 3, Scene 1 Mwanaida (Juma sister) tells Elisa that her parents are saying they should not drive non-Juma boda bodas, specifically Abu, who Elisa has been driving with. Mwanaida says Abu is a bad persn and they commit crimes. Elisa blames the girl who had her earring stolen for being a victim of the crime.

Ep. 3, Scene 4 Abu tries to pick up Elisa but Juma sees them and confronts Abu about his dirty deeds and links them to the story about Ali and Mwanaida spending time together (people saw them together even though nothing took place). Many good quotations in this scene.

Ep. 3, Scene 5 Juma and Ali fight but nobody wins.

Ep. 3, Scene 6 Key plot pint - Juma talks to his friend Hamisi and tells him they must try to convince their boda boda to not do illegal activities anymore (and that they should all recognize their own individual role in sexual violence and avoid hypocrisy, so no more pornography either).

Ep. 3, Scene 6b Abu and Ali go to party, see Shemsia. Abu invites Shemsia out and then rapes her (not explicit, just him forcing her into the house).

Ep. 5, Scene 2 Mwanaidi and Elisa aren't talking to each other. But with another friend she is still warning Elisa about Abu.

Ep. 5, Scene 4 Abu arranges meeting with Sugar daddy but complains it's becoming more difficult with Juma and Hamisi playing detective.

Ep. 5, Scene 5 ** Juma announces to Abu that he is starting an NGO to end sexual violence. Hamisi gives him a high five. Much joy and celebration.

Ep. 6, Scene 2 Sugar daddy went to a guest house, and a room attendant wanted him to register him in the book and he refused. The second attendant came and saved him from registering. He said the first attendant does not understand how to deal with repeat customers. The second attendant tells him to make sure girls come without school uniform. First attendant says it's against the rule but second attendant says it's the only way they can make money.

Ep. 6, Scene 3 Abu drops off girl to the hotel, and tells her he loves her but she should see the other man for him. The attendants let her in but argue among themselves about whether it is right to let young girls the age of their daughters to have relationships with men.

Narration: As you can see, the problem was not just the Bodas and sugar daddies. It was also the people in the community who refused to report sexual violence when they witnessed it, the people who thought someone else's behavior was none of their business. Sexual violence is a problem not just because of the people who commit and facilitate it, but also because of people who see it and say nothing. We needed someone in our community to step up and convince people to report on sexual crimes. That person was Juma.

Ep. 6, Scene 5 Juma confronts Ali and Abu and their boda bodas. Juma says "i am onto you, i cant keep quiet when you are doing this bad stuff" All the bodas bodas say "go away". Then Abu receives sugar daddy call. Ali says "don't worry about this Juma fellow."

Ep. 7, Scene 1 ** Elisa (lover of Abu, the bad boda) talks to Shemsia about Shemsia getting raped. Shemsia described the incident and impact. Elisa says perpetrator must be punished, and asks her to reveal his name / report. Shemsia does not but implies it's Abu, which Elisa does not believe, and encourages her to continue reporting. Ep. 11, Scene 3 Abu convinces Elisa to give him a kiss

Ep. 7, Scene 3 Juma reports that the boda boda anti-sexual violence initiative is reporting on sugar daddies who are going to embarrass them at hotels where they have guests. Then they take the sugar daddy to the police. Ali is saying that's not professional. Juma is saying it's not legal to take young girls to engage in sexual intercourse, or to transport corpses (?). Juma is saying they should be able to do it at

their station if boda bodas are doing it at other stations.

Ep. 11, Scene 1 The NPA committee meets with Juma and they decide it would be good to have a workshop with the Boda Bodas because they are aworried about the current state of events and they want UZIKWASA to run the workshop

Ep. 11, Scene 2 Jubba says we are going to a workshop and Abu and Ali say "we don't want to go to a workshop, we want to work". Juma is saying it is a campaign against violence to students and young girls. They are pretending they do not know there is violence in their communities. But the guy who reported the beach rapist sides with Juma. The question about Abu buying Elisa a phone also comes out.

Ep. 13, Scene 1 A conversation between boda boda drivers with the workshop facilitator in the conference hall. These boda boda were trying to show how they are part of gender-based violence problem in their communities. Juma explains that all boda boda drivers should understand how they are part of the problem as a starting point for them to solve the problem. Boda 3 explained of taking a student to a guest house, Jibo explains of leaving a room to his friend and later finding out that his friend raped a student in this room, the night he left. The facilitator asks if they feel indebted to the society and most of them say yes to starting campaigns against gender-based violence. Ally asks if any measures will be taken to any boda boda driver who wouldn't want to participate in the GBV campaign. All the other boda drivers scream at him but the facilitator answers that participation in the campaign is entirely voluntary but if one is not participating in the campaign, he should make sure he is not part of the problem. Juma leads the process of formulating a song against GBV as well as a slogan. The facilitator wishes them well and assures them that UZIKWASA and the police authorities will be offering them full support during their campaigns. Meanwhile Abou and Ali are having a conversation and Abou is not willing to join the campaign because taking young girls to guest houses for some sugar daddies is the main source of his income. Ali is not convinced with Abou's argument. Mwanaidi's mother asks Juma regarding the progress of their boda boda training. Juma explains that the training they got have increased awareness regarding gender-based violence. However, there are some bod boda drivers at their station who yet cooperating. He explains of finding Abou and Elisa and he warned Abou of engaging with students. He hopes that the campaign will awaken more people to stop gender-based violence.

Narration: the workshop seemed to have made an impression on the Bodas. The Bodas realized how they were contributing to the problem not only by facilitating or engaging in sexual violence, but by failing to report sexual violence when they saw it. They now understood that remaining silent was almost as bad as committing

the crime yourself. But would their new attitudes translate into actual behaviors like monitoring and reporting on bad bodas and sugar daddies?

Ep. 13, Scene 4 Mbwana, the sugar daddy goes to his friend's house. He complains that his wife left the house. Jumbe is not surprised. Jumbe tells Mbwana that his wife was ashamed of Mbwana because of his behaviour of having an affair with young school girls. He warns Mbwana that if he continues that behaviour, He will report him to the village authorities. He also warns him that he might be trapped since the boda boda now have a campaign against such habits. Mbwana is not convinced that the boda boda campaign will succeed because most of them act as agents for old men who need school girls and earn their income from that.

Ep. 14 Scene 1 Mbwana is at the boda boda station. He tells Jibo that he used to be Abou's good customer but lately they have not been in good terms because Abou has betrayed him. Mbwana tells Jibo that he would be asking him to bring him his guests at the guesthouse. Jibo rejects Mbwana's request and warns him that he will report him to the village authorities if he continues with that behaviour. Mbwana tells Jibo that he is surprised with Jibo's rejection of his offer because that is where many boda drivers make money from. Jibo insists on rejecting Mbwana's offer. Mbwana is upset and he leaves.

Ep. 14, Scene 2 Juma arrives at the station. He asks Jibo why he was arguing with Mbwana. Jibo explains that Mbwana was at the station to ask for Jibo's mobile number so that he can call him when he wants to meet with school girls at guest houses. Jibo also tells that he is aware of the affair Mbwana had with Ashura (a student). Jibo suggests that he is going to report Mbwana to the Village executive officer so that he can be called and warned. Jibo also asks Juma to find out how boda boda drivers can get access to credit to conduct their businesses. That way they will refrain from criminal activities such as taking young girls to guest houses for commission payments.

Ep. 18, Scene 1 Mbwana is at the police station. A case is filed against him for having sexual relationships with school girls. He asks the police officer to help him solve the case but the police officer is afraid that he cannot help Mbwana in his case. He only advises him that he might be free if he is bailed out. Mbwana faints and they call the ambulance to take him to the hospital.

Narration: It was the first big success of the campaign. By organizing and educating the Bodas, Juma had made them more likely to refuse to help sugar daddies and to report sugar daddies to the village authorities. But the real test was this: would the Bodas report on EACH OTHER? Or would they fail to report on people they considered friends, even brothers?

Ep. 15, Scene1 At the boda boda station. The campaign song against GBV is played on the radio. Juma gives feedback regarding the request of boda boda drivers to get access to loans. Juma informs them that he made a follow up and he was told that the boda drivers should form groups of 10 to 15 people so that they can be given a loan. Those people also need to have valid national identity cards as well as a feasible business idea. They all agree to form groups as soon as possible. Abou says that he is not willing to join others to ask for loans or opening another business rather he will just keep on with his one boda boda.

Ep. 19, Scene 1 Scene at a dance hall, where customer tries to get boda to take him and young girl to the beach, but boda refuses. Abu doesn't take customer because he has his eyes on another girl. But another boda helps the customer in the end for extra money.

Ep. 19, Scene 2 Juma, Ali, Abu and thers report that a girl was raped on the beach the previous night and was taken by a boda boda from their kijiwe. Juma argues that boda bodos should be repsonsible for illegal things that they help facilitate, Ali disagrees. Other boda boda says he saw the man and will report it.

Ep. 19, Scene 3 Salama (the girl who was raped) is in the hospital. Her mom a teacher comes to see her. They speak to the police. Police say she is afraid and was dressed in a way that brought on the crime. Her mom responds that no one deserves this regardless of how they are dressed. They all say that boda bodas should be responsible for reporting or stopping this. Boda from Juma's kijiwe arrives and says he saw the boda boda who took the girl away.

Ep. 19, Scene 6 Police comes to the station and they take away the boda boda driver who had taken the girl to the beach where she was raped. Abu is afraid of the police. The one who reported says its not betrayal it is just keeping everyone accountable for their actions.

Narration: It was the first time a boda had ever reported on another boda. But it would not be the last time. The bodas were beginning to hold each other accountable for their behavior, keeping a watchful eye for those who tried to engage in or facilitate sexual violence, and reporting them. It was not easy – sometimes they were reporting on people they had known their whole lives – but they knew it was the right thing to do and the only way to protect women and girls in their community. Pretty soon, people who would have once considered engaging in sexual violence – either raping, or transporting or facilitating rape, or tricking young girls into having sex – were stopping, knowing they would get caught. All of them, that is, except one...

Ep. 15, Scene 2 Elisa goes to Abou's home to get books as Abou had promised her. She finds Nanaa and Abou. Abou sends Nanaa to buy him a pineapple. He then welcomes Elisa inside the house. Elisa insists

on staying outside but Abou insists it won't be good if people in the village saw her standing outside the house. Elisa gets in Abou's house. Abou rapes her and threatens to harm her if she reports him anywhere. Elisa is disappointed and leaves while crying.

Ep. 15, Scene 4 Abou goes back to the boda boda station and explains to Ali how he raped Elisa. Abou tells him that he started an affair with Adelina to make Elisa jealous. When Elisa came to his place, he felt it was the right time. Ali asks what Abou's plans are in case Elisa gets pregnant. Abou plans to abandon Elisa in case she becomes pregnant. Ali feels bad about Abou's actions and urges him to stop and warns him of the danger he is putting himself into given that the GBV campaigns have already started. Elisa passes near the boda station and Abou starts laughing at her.

Ep. 15, Scene 3 At school Mwanaidi and Ashura find Elisa crying in the washroom. Elisa apologizes to Mwanaidi for not listening to her all along. She tells them that Abou raped her when she went to his home to get books. Mwanaidi promises to help her get justice. Ashura asks Elisa not to tell other girls in her school that she was raped but Elisa refuses to remain silent. She wants to speak out to save other girls from being raped like her. Elisa plans to tell Adelina, Abou's new girl friend about Abou raping her. Elisa stops crying and they go back to class.

Ep. 16, Scene 5 At Adelina's home Adelina tells Abou that she wants nothing to do with him. She has heard of all the bad things he's done and no longer wants to have an affair with Abou. Abou tries to convince Elisa that he will marry her but Adelina refuses to listen to him, instead she plans to support others to report Abou.

Ep. 18, Scene 2 At School Mwanaidi, Hamisa and Mwaju are at a school. They are discussing on the measures to take to fight against GBV done by boda boda drivers. Mwanaidi suggests that they should cooperate together. She also suggests that they talk to their teacher to call for a students meeting where they will talk on these issues. Students should also join the campaign against GBV.

Ep. 17, Scene 3 At school The teacher asks the students what they understand by gender based violence and some answered that it means rape or being given money and gifts in return for having a sexual affair with someone. The teacher tells them to refuse any kinds of such acts and report at home, at school or any other elderly leader.

**narration: The movement that had begun with the boda bodas spread to the community at large, even to young students. Mwanaidi decided to organize and educate the students, just like Juma had organized and educated the Bodas. And after the workshop, girls realized that they should report sexual violence

whenever it occurred, and that people would listen to them. It was this realization that gave Shemsia, the girl who was attacked at the dance hall, the courage to report what happened to her.**

Hatua zimeanza bodaboda wamenza kuelimisha jamii kwa ukubwa hata kwa wanafunzi wakike. Mwanaidi ameamua kuwaelimisha wanafunzi, kama vile juma alivyowaelimisha bodaboda. Na baada ya semina, wasichana wanagungua kwamba wanatakiwa kuripoti unyanyasaji wa kingono kila unapotokea, na watu watawasikiliza. Ni utambuzi huu unaompa Shamsia, msichana aliyebakwa kwenye kigodoro nguvu ya kuripoti kilichomkuta.

Ep. 18, Scene 5 Shemsia is at the police station with her school teacher. The teacher asks Shemsia to be confident and give her statement to the police explaining the occasion when Abou raped her. Shemsia gives her statement to the police while crying saying that she feels humiliated and scared that she has lost her dignity. The teacher comforts her that everything will be fine and Abou will be arrested.

Ep. 19, Scene 5 At Shemsia's home. Abou goes to Shemsia's house to apologize to her. Shemsia refuses to accept his apology. She says he deserves to be punished for his actions to the girls in the community.

Ep. 20, Scene 6 Abou speaks to Juma at the station. He asks Juma to take care of Nanaa because he is the only one Abou can trust. He says that he is expecting to be sentenced for a long period of time. He is sad that he will not be there for his young sister, Nanaa since he will have to go to prison. Abou starts crying. He asks Juma to take his 4 boda boda and use them to earn income to help Nanaa and Shangazi (Abou's aunt).

Narration: Every village has its problems, and ours still has its problems. But by working together, we were able to make great progress in solving the important issue of gender violence. It started with one person, Juma, who decided to organize the bodas to report on those who facilitated or engaged in gender violence. But the actions of the bodas inspired others in the community, from students to guesthouse attendants, to also report sexual crimes to the authorities. Now, our daughters, sisters, and mothers are able to live without the same fear of being attacked or mistreated. It just goes to show: a small ripple can sometimes become a big wave.

C Ethics

Research on gender based violence presents a number of important ethical considerations. Here, we discuss steps the research team took to ensure the autonomy and well-being of study participants and surveyors.

First, we sought to ensure that the community screening intervention did not do psychological harm to individuals who had been subject to forced marriage or intimate partner violence. UZIKWASA, the non-governmental organization that produced the *Tamapendo* program, developed the content through over a year of discussions and pilot testing with Tanga communities to ensure that the content did not produce adverse impacts. The research team also piloted the abridged version of *Tamapendo* used in the intervention in two communities, and found that the program was well received across age and gender lines. Finally, the field team collected and shared daily qualitative reports about community discussions and feedback following the screenings with the rest of the research team as a precaution against adverse events. We received no negative reports about the reception of *Tamapendo* during the intervention.

Second, we designed the data collection process to ensure that neither the baseline nor endline surveys undermined the safety of research participants. The survey asked about general attitudes towards intimate partner violence and forced marriage in general rather than about the respondents' direct experience with EFM or IPV. Second, we worked closely with UZIKWASA and Tanzanian researchers to ensure that the wording of questions, in particular vignettes depicting early and forced marriage scenarios, reflected realistic situations without provoking adverse emotional effects.

Third, we took several measures to ensure the safety of research staff. There is a historical legacy of strong resistance to outsider interventions and research in rural Tanga, including accusations of witchcraft and religious interference. To mitigate these risks, a two-person survey scoping team visited every village before baseline data collection to discuss the survey and intervention with political and religious leaders in each village. In two villages, when the baseline survey team flagged the potential for community resistance, we delayed the implementation of treatment and endline data collection until community acceptance and survey team safety could be assured.

C.1 COVID19

This project was implemented and data were collected in the midst of the *omicron* wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (early 2022). The research team took special precautions to protect subjects and staff. We

obtained approval from [redacted] University and Innovations for Poverty Action COVID-19 review board to carry out the data collection, and designed transportation and data collection procedures with COVID-19 risks in mind. Interviewers wore masks during interviews, which were conducted outside at appropriate distances. Respondents were offered masks but not required to use them. Before moving between Districts, the survey team spoke with District officials and health care workers to find out whether COVID-19 cases had been identified in the area. Thankfully, no cases of COVID-19 were reported among survey staff or in participating villages during the data collection period.

D Research Design - Sampling

D.1 Village Sampling

We conducted an initial census of wards (as defined by the 2018 Tanzanian Census) with at least two villages that met the following criteria: (1) they were located at least 4 kilometres from a major town or city; (2) no main or secondary road ran through the village and its immediate surroundings; (3) at least 60 households resided within a 1,000 meter radius of the village center, as estimated from satellite images; (4) a ward contained at least two villages 2.5 kilometres from one another; and (5) the villages were unable to receive Pangani FM's radio signal. We identified 17 wards with 34 villages meeting the target criteria in the vicinity of Tanga town and Korogwe town, two mid-sized cities in Tanga Region.

D.2 Screening Attendees Sampling

In each village, we employed a four-step strategy to identify the study participants. First, the research team used satellite maps to identify the approximate village radius between 200 and 1,000 meters from the village center based on the population density of the village inferred from satellite images. Second, a census team identified all households living within the village radius, as well as two key information to determine household eligibility: members of the household had to have been living in the village for at least six months, and at least one member of the household had to be between 18 and 65 years old. Third, the census team's survey software randomly selected 20 households for the female respondent group and 20 households for the male respondent group, and randomly selected a household member of the targeted gender. Female respondents were interviewed by women, and male respondents were interviewed by men. Fourth, if an individual of the targeted gender and age range was not available from the household during the census phase, the household was dropped and a replacement household was randomly selected.

E Supplementary Tables

E.1 Design

Table A1: **Balance**

Variable	Treatment	Comparison	RI - <i>value</i>	Observations
Reject IPV	2.290	2.410	0.020	1,259
Tribe: Wadigo	0.259	0.280	0.060	1,259
Number of people known in village	2.523	2.616	0.140	1,258
Political participation index	2.043	1.966	0.160	1,259
Age	40.553	39.831	0.200	1,259
Assets: Metal roof	0.809	0.764	0.240	1,259
Listen to TBC	0.265	0.202	0.240	673
Feeling thermometer: CCM	87.660	85.915	0.240	1,253
Pay attention to the news	3.011	3.185	0.240	1,205
Gender equality: equal jobs	0.450	0.506	0.260	1,259
Prefer state to solve disputes: divorce	0.273	0.296	0.280	1,259
.	0.548	0.455	0.280	1,259
Number of kids in household	4.071	3.902	0.280	1,259
Assets: Cell phone	0.776	0.807	0.280	1,259
Risk prevention activities: send others on errands	0.457	0.526	0.320	1,255
Feeling thermometer: Boda boda drivers	59.554	64.121	0.320	508
Should get permit for firewood	0.811	0.774	0.340	1,259
Listen to social programs on radio	0.123	0.154	0.340	1,259
Ever visited town	2.966	2.818	0.360	1,257
Is it safe: walking home after dark	0.703	0.668	0.360	1,259
Feeling thermometer: People from Kenya	42.965	38.274	0.360	226
Primary language is swahili	0.599	0.528	0.380	1,259
Environment more important than development	0.660	0.629	0.380	1,259
Risk prevention activities: go home early	0.566	0.632	0.380	1,257
Mosque/Church visits per week	5.194	6.016	0.400	1,248
Gender equality: equal earning ok	0.337	0.361	0.400	1,259
Political preference ranking: water	4.652	4.885	0.420	1,259
Feeling thermometer: Muslims	91.058	89.372	0.420	1,256
Job: Farming	0.728	0.680	0.420	1,259
Political preference rmaking: GBV	2.523	2.629	0.440	1,259
Is it safe: riding boda alone	0.207	0.164	0.440	1,259
Others would get permit for firewood	0.396	0.423	0.440	1,259
Gender equality: women can lead	0.666	0.688	0.460	1,259
Listen to Taifa FM	0.291	0.322	0.460	673
Gender equality: no reject forced marriage	0.824	0.847	0.460	1,258
Political knowledge index	1.373	1.416	0.500	1,259
Political preference ranking: environment	3.120	3.005	0.500	1,259
Has significant other	0.744	0.711	0.520	1,259
Partner would support daughter entering politics	0.704	0.736	0.520	937
Feeling thermometer: People from Dar	69.293	70.920	0.540	1,220
Assets: Radios (number)	0.419	0.450	0.540	1,259
Feeling thermometer: Samia Hassan	82.156	83.442	0.560	1,253
Job: small business	0.160	0.174	0.580	1,259
Listen to romance programs on radio	0.118	0.128	0.580	1,259
Ever listen to RFA	0.419	0.438	0.580	1,219
Environment: Getting worse	0.888	0.872	0.580	1,259
Accepts PPE	0.494	0.455	0.580	1,259
Would support daughter entering politics	0.741	0.764	0.600	1,259
Religious school	0.625	0.642	0.600	1,258
Listen to sports on radio	0.408	0.387	0.620	1,259
Feeling thermometer: Female bartenders	21.269	19.512	0.640	253
Education: finished standard 7	0.761	0.771	0.640	1,259
Tribe: Wazigua	0.107	0.089	0.660	1,259
Muslim	0.755	0.797	0.660	1,259
Political preference ranking: education	4.598	4.514	0.680	1,259
.	0.315	0.333	0.680	1,259
Reject early marriage: religion	0.784	0.793	0.680	1,259
.	0.388	0.413	0.680	1,259
Causes of environmental problems: humans	0.570	0.585	0.680	1,259
.	0.349	0.325	0.700	1,259
Political preference ranking: health	4.797	4.733	0.700	1,259
Should be equal female and male leaders	0.651	0.659	0.700	1,259
Feeling thermometer: Doctors	86.983	86.289	0.720	249
Feeling thermometer: Christians	71.576	70.436	0.720	1,249
Speaks non-swahili language	0.818	0.836	0.720	1,259
Assets: TV	0.160	0.176	0.740	1,259
Assets: Radios	0.387	0.403	0.740	1,259
Listened to radio in last two weeks	0.725	0.763	0.760	1,259
Head of household	0.470	0.476	0.780	1,259
Lived in village since 16	0.580	0.592	0.780	1,258
Listened to radio ever	0.539	0.530	0.780	1,259
Interest in politics	1.943	1.925	0.800	1,259
Political preference ranking: roads	4.410	4.387	0.820	1,259
Has seen police this year	-6.840	-7.447	0.820	1,259
Feeling thermometer: Chinese people	47.701	47.482	0.860	1,137
Tribe: Sambaa	0.446	0.441	0.860	1,259
Listen to gospel on radio	0.242	0.236	0.880	1,259
Prefer state to solve disputes: court	0.530	0.533	0.900	1,259
Identify with tribe or nation	2.348	2.359	0.920	1,259
.	3.901	3.847	0.920	1,259
Would support son entering politics	0.856	0.862	0.940	1,259
Has visited court ever	-2.789	-1.338	0.940	1,259
.	0.120	0.112	0.940	1,259
Reject early marriage: pregnancy	0.621	0.616	0.960	1,259
.	0.230	0.233	0.960	1,259
How doing today	1.436	1.434	0.980	1,259
Tribe: Other	0.188	0.190	0.980	1,259
.	0.606	0.607	0.980	1,259
Community thinks should be equal female and male leaders	0.484	0.489	1.000	1,259

Note: *p*-values are the result of a grouped F-test across both treatment groups.

Table A2: **Attrition and Compliance**

	Attended Any Screening		Midline Attrition	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
EFM Treat	0.035	0.036	-0.010	-0.010
Standard Error	0.012	0.015	0.005	0.007
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.048	0.032	0.121	0.868
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.91	0.91	0.02	0.02
Control SD	0.08	0.08	0.02	0.02
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	20	No	0
Adj- R^2	0.04	0.06	0.00	0.00
Observations	1,358	1,358	1,360	1,360

Standard errors clustered at the village level. Compliance takes a value 1 if respondent was marked as present at the start of the audio screening, and 0 otherwise. Attrition takes the value 1 if the respondent was not interviewed in the midline survey.

E.2 Norms results detail

Table A3: **Belief about community's perception of risk of violence against women**

	Index		Think others in community believe actions are risky					
	Index		Leave village alone		Take boda trip alone		Attend large social events	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
GBV Treat	0.029	0.024	0.014	0.021	0.079**	0.071**	-0.007	-0.006
Standard Error	0.017	0.018	0.022	0.021	0.024	0.029	0.025	0.028
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.252	0.136	0.649	0.239	0.035	0.025	0.826	0.562
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.52	0.52	0.69	0.69	0.50	0.50	0.37	0.37
Control SD	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.08
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Controls	No	43	No	42	No	19	No	10
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.01	0.12	0.01	0.09	0.02	0.10	-0.00	0.05
Observations	1,246	1,246	1,245	1,245	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: midline compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table. Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: “Do you think most [randomize: men / women] in your community think that it is safe for a girl to travel to town by herself?” Columns 5 and 6 report results for responses to the question: “Do you think most [randomize: men / women] in your community think that it is safe for a woman or a girl in your community to ride with a boda boda alone?”. Columns 7 and 8 report results for responses to the question: “To be safe, do women in your community avoid attending certain celebrations or parties in the village?”

Table A4: **Belief about community's response to GBV**

	Index		Perceived community response to gender based violence			
	Index		Report GBV		Testify against GBV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GBV Treat	0.025	0.026*	0.029	0.032*	0.022	0.026
Standard Error	0.013	0.017	0.016	0.020	0.020	0.024
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.198	0.079	0.237	0.095	0.452	0.195
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.53	0.53	0.60	0.60	0.45	0.45
Control SD	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Controls	No	4	No	9	No	11
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.03
Observations	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246	1,246

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: midline compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table. Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: “Your cousin tells you that he found out about a man in their community who is having a relationship with a girl who is still in secondary school. Your cousin has heard that the girl is saying yes to the man because he gives her money. How do you think most others in the community would respond?” The responses are scored as 0 for do nothing, 1 for report to family, and 2 for report to government; then the variable is divided by 2 to standardize to a 0-1. Columns 5 and 6 report results for responses to the question: “Imagine that you found out that an boda boda driver had sex with a girl in secondary school. Someone from the court calls you and invites you to come to the court to be a witness against the man. You will have to spend one or two days in court away from work and family, and the transport fees will cost 2,000. How do you think most others in the community would respond?”. Responses are scored as 0 for not testifying and 1 for testifying.

E.3 Heterogeneous effects by gender

E.3.1 Perception of risk of GBV

Table A5: **Descriptive: Perception of risk of violence against women**
Sample: Midline compliers, control group

	Activities perceived as risky for women			Activities perceived as suspicious for women	
	Leave alone	Boda alone	Attend alone	Old man gives gift	Boda offers ride
Women	0.79	0.66	0.58	0.57	0.37
	319	319	319	319	319
Men	0.86	0.67	N.A.	0.49	0.34
	289	319	N.A.	289	319
Overall	0.82	0.66	0.58	0.53	0.36
	608	608	319	608	608

Note: Proportion of midline compliers in the control group who perceive the scenario as risky. Number of observations reported below the mean. Activities perceived as risky ask “Now I will ask you some questions about your community. I would like you to tell me if you think these activities put women at risk of sexual assault.”: (1) Travel alone: “Do you think it is safe or risky for a girl in your community to travel to town by herself?”; (2) Boda alone: “Do you think it is safe or risky for a woman or a girl in your community to ride with a boda boda alone?”; and (3) Attend alone, for women: “To be safe, do you avoid attending certain celebrations or parties in the village?”, and for men: “Now I would like to know about women in your community. To be safe, do women in your community avoid attending certain celebrations or parties in the village?”. Activities perceived as suspicious ask “Imagine that two of your friends from your village are having a conversation about some things that men and women do, and each friend shares a different opinion about what these actions mean. Which friend do you agree the most with?”: (1) Gifts offer: “Friend 1: If an older man gives a gift to a young girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he wants to be generous with her. Friend 2: If an older man gives a gift to a young girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he is hoping to start a romantic relationship with her.”; (2) Ride offer: “Friend 1: When a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he is just trying to be nice. Friend 2: When a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he does so because he wants to be romantically intimate with her..”

Table A6: **Effect on perception of risk of violence against women**
Sample by Gender

	Index		Activities perceived as risky for women				Actions perceived as suspicious for women			
	Index (same)		Leave village alone		Boda trip alone		Old man give gifts		Boda offers free ride	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A: men										
GBV Treat	0.055**	0.066***	0.032	0.033	0.073	0.106**	0.043	0.043	0.072*	0.081**
Standard Error	0.017	0.021	0.021	0.031	0.035	0.036	0.027	0.037	0.024	0.035
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.037	0.007	0.287	0.139	0.173	0.022	0.280	0.142	0.062	0.036
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.59	0.59	0.86	0.86	0.68	0.68	0.49	0.49	0.34	0.34
Control SD	0.06	0.06	0.09	0.09	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.09	0.12	0.12
Controls	No	11	No	0	No	10	No	2	No	6
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.11	0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.13	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.06
Observations	611	611	611	611	611	611	611	611	611	611
Panel B: women										
GBV Treat	0.094***	0.067***	0.089**	0.070***	0.125**	0.079**	0.030	0.027	0.133**	0.095**
Standard Error	0.020	0.017	0.021	0.019	0.031	0.032	0.031	0.034	0.040	0.041
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.004	0.003	0.013	0.007	0.013	0.027	0.472	0.243	0.031	0.032
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.60	0.60	0.79	0.79	0.66	0.66	0.57	0.57	0.38	0.38
Control SD	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.12	0.18	0.18	0.11	0.11
Controls	No	29	No	26	No	23	No	23	No	26
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.07	0.20	0.03	0.13	0.03	0.17	0.06	0.13	0.04	0.11
Observations	640	640	639	639	640	640	640	640	640	640
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Sample: midline compliers. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. Columns 1 and 2 report results for an index that is the mean of the other responses in the table (note that this is different from the index in Table 1 as it includes these same 4 variables that were asked both to men and women). Columns 3 and 4 report results for responses to the question: “Do you think it is safe or risky for a girl in your community to travel to town by herself?” Columns 5 and 6 report results for responses to the question: “Do you think it is safe or risky for a woman or a girl in your community to ride with a boda boda alone?”. Columns 7 and 8 report results for responses to the question: “Which friend do you agree the most with? Friend 1: If an older man gives a gift to a young girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he wants to be generous with her; Friend 2: If an older man gives a gift to a young girl who is his neighbor, he does so because he is hoping to start a romantic relationship with her.”. Columns 9 and 10 report results for responses to the question: “Which friend do you agree the most with? Friend 1: When a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he is just trying to be nice. Friend 2: When a man offers a ride to a woman he barely knows, he does so because he wants to be romantically intimate with her.”

E.3.2 Response to GBV

Table A7: **Response to GBV**
Sample by Gender

	Index		How to respond to gender based violence					
	Index		Report GBV		Punish GBV		Testify against GBV	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: men								
GBV Treat	0.049*	0.049**	0.037	0.036*	0.006	0.015	0.102**	0.095**
Standard Error	0.017	0.019	0.020	0.028	0.026	0.029	0.032	0.033
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.079	0.031	0.194	0.092	0.848	0.319	0.038	0.021
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.65	0.65	0.62	0.62	0.68	0.68	0.66	0.66
Control SD	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.14	0.14	0.17	0.17
Controls	No	16	No	0	No	13	No	16
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.05	0.14	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.15
Observations	607	607	607	607	596	596	607	607
Panel B: women								
GBV Treat	0.013	0.016	0.016	0.019	-0.001	-0.003	0.030	0.045
Standard Error	0.015	0.018	0.017	0.021	0.030	0.030	0.038	0.042
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.553	0.244	0.531	0.250	0.984	0.539	0.561	0.198
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.61	0.61	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.68	0.47	0.47
Control SD	0.06	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Controls	No	3	No	12	No	7	No	16
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.06	0.02	0.05	-0.00	0.09
Observations	639	639	639	639	629	629	639	639
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. See above for outcome description.

E.3.3 Political Priorities of GBV

Table A8: **Political salience of GBV**
Sample by Gender

	Index		Measures of Anti-GBV Prioritization					
	Index		Vote anti-GBV platform		Anti-GBV political prior.		Anti-GBV social prior.	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: men								
GBV Treat	0.086***	0.083***	0.100**	0.103**	0.069*	0.070**	0.092***	0.094***
Standard Error	0.016	0.022	0.029	0.040	0.022	0.027	0.018	0.021
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.005	0.003	0.028	0.017	0.052	0.020	0.004	0.002
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.47	0.47	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.43	0.43
Control SD	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.09	0.09	0.06	0.06
Controls	No	4	No	4	No	8	No	12
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.10	0.03	0.09
Observations	607	607	607	607	596	596	596	596
Panel B: women								
GBV Treat	0.072***	0.064***	0.091*	0.071*	0.064**	0.071***	0.076**	0.074**
Standard Error	0.017	0.018	0.032	0.030	0.018	0.022	0.022	0.029
RI <i>p</i> -value	0.009	0.002	0.071	0.053	0.023	0.009	0.019	0.010
Hypothesis	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Control Mean	0.50	0.50	0.51	0.51	0.47	0.47	0.51	0.51
Control SD	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.09	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
Controls	No	25	No	21	No	15	No	2
Adj- <i>R</i> ²	0.06	0.17	0.02	0.12	0.05	0.15	0.02	0.03
Observations	639	639	639	639	629	629	629	629
DV Range	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]	[0-1]
Blocked FE	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, and *** $p < 0.01$. Standard errors clustered at the village level. Positive coefficients imply progressive attitudes. See above for outcome description.